Generate SBOMs for a sample project in SPDX and CycloneDX and compare them.
Run OSV-Scanner and Scorecard on a project and triage the results.
Done when you can…
Produce an SBOM and a prioritised list of dependency risks for a project.
Describe three real supply chain attacks and what would have stopped them.
Beginner
How supply chain attacks work
Study the real incidents: compromised build systems, poisoned updates, hijacked packages and stolen maintainer accounts. They show where the chain breaks.
Match your SBOM against vulnerability databases, work out whether the vulnerable code is reachable, and prioritise. Not every CVE in a dependency affects you.
Sign and verify artefacts, including with Sigstore.
Assess and raise a build's SLSA level.
Generate and verify provenance.
Control what enters the build from registries.
Hands-on projects and labs
Sign a container image with Cosign and enforce verification at deployment.
Generate SLSA provenance for a build and verify it with the SLSA verifier.
Set up a private registry or proxy and pin all dependencies for a project.
Done when you can…
Ship an artefact with signature and provenance that a consumer can verify.
Move a build up at least one SLSA level with evidence.
Intermediate
Code and artefact signing
Sign commits, packages and containers so consumers can verify they are unchanged and from you. Protect the signing keys or the signature means nothing.
Isolated, ephemeral, reproducible builds with pinned inputs stop an attacker tampering in the middle. Pipeline security and supply chain security meet here.
Private registries, mirrored packages, pinned versions and verified downloads cut exposure to public registry attacks. Control what can enter the build.
Vendor software carries the same risks and you see even less of it. Ask for SBOMs, attestations and secure development evidence, and verify what you can.
Executive orders, the EU Cyber Resilience Act and large customers now set supply chain expectations. Track them and turn them into engineering requirements.
Modern software is mostly assembled from open-source packages, built by automated systems and distributed through registries. Each link in that chain can be attacked: a malicious package, a compromised maintainer, a tampered build or a hijacked update.
Supply chain security tracks what is in your software (SBOMs), verifies where it came from (provenance and signing), hardens how it is built (SLSA), and manages the risk of the open-source and vendor components you rely on. Major incidents have made it a priority for governments and large buyers.
Why it matters
Attacks through dependencies and build systems reach thousands of victims at once and are hard to detect. Regulators and customers now ask for SBOMs and attestations, so organisations need engineers who can produce them and act on them.
Typical job roles
Mid-levelSupply chain security engineerImplements SBOMs, signing and provenance.
Mid-levelOpen-source security engineerManages the risk of open-source components.
SeniorBuild security engineerHardens build systems to SLSA levels.
LeadSupply chain security leadOwns the programme and customer attestations.